

NEW YORK TIMES

DATE 4 Oct 71

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## K.C.B.'s Efforts to Neutralize A Spy's Defection Are Outlined

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Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 — States intelligence services. Within hours of the defection of a Soviet spy—such as Oleg Lyalin who defected to Britain last month—the Soviet K.G.B., or State Security Committee, begins immediate, sweeping protective measures within and outside the Soviet Union, experts here say.

The countermeasures have been worked out over 50 years of Soviet espionage experience and are effective, the experts say. They have a two-fold aim. One is to obscure the gravity of the defection in the eyes of international public opinion by quickly publishing counter-charges of "provocation" or "cold war" tactics.

The second aim is to alert subagents or contacts of the defector to disappear until the storm blows over. This behind-the-scenes effort is a race against time between the K.G.B. and Western security services.

The charges made the other day by H.A.R. (Kim) Philby in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia contending that at least seven British diplomats with Mideast experience are intelligence officers are viewed here as part of the intelligence technique known as "disinformation."

### 'Muddying the Waters'

"It's essentially muddying the waters, stirring up counter-charges that attract headlines and divert attention from the defector," one specialist said. "Kim Philby is very experienced. He's giving the K.G.B. advice."

Philby, who became a Communist in 1934 during his undergraduate days at Cambridge University, defected to the Soviet Union in 1963. He penetrated British intelligence in World War II and later rose to be head of its most sensitive section—the one working to counter Soviet spies.

In 1949 Philby was sent to the British Embassy here as liaison officer with United

Soviet defector, the Central Intelligence Agency learned that Philby was a double agent. It was not until 1963, however, that he finally fled to the Soviet Union.

On Aug. 18 this year, Philby granted an interview to a Czechoslovak journalist in Moscow. Extracts from his forthcoming book on espionage were published. It is believed here that the K.G.B. then knew—or suspected—that Lyalin, who was drinking heavily, might be exposed and so used the Philby interview as a veiled warning to British intelligence.

"He knows a lot of secrets and he can cook up a lot," a former acquaintance of Philby said. "This may have been a warning to London to leave the Russians alone—or he'd sing."

It now appears to experts here that Philby is playing a major role in "orchestrating" the K.G.B.'s disinformation chorus against Britain. One source noted that Philby had accused the British Government of barring 105 suspected Soviet spies to "slow down the process of relaxation of tension in Europe."

Apart from the disinformation campaign when a Soviet spy defects, the experts say, the K.G.B. makes an exhaustive "damage report."

### Defector's History Examined

When a defection is known or suspected, orders are flashed to the K.G.B. "residents" or spy chiefs, in key foreign posts to "neutralize" potential damage, the experts say.

In K.G.B. headquarters in Moscow hundreds of personnel are apparently drafted to examine the defector's history—who recommended him for employment, his family, friends, colleagues and background.

"Every file a defector ever signed for is examined to find out what he may have had access to," one source said.

SCAE file